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INTRODUCTION
For the past ten years, homeowners across the country have been
discovering that when it comes to contracts to purchase real property,
it pays to read the fine print.' In the early 2000s, a Texas company
began attaching private transfer fee covenantS2  ("TFCs") to
properties in residential communities.' A TFC purportedly allows the
developer to collect one percent of the sales price from future sellers
every time the property is sold for the next ninety-nine years.' There
are many problems with this practice, but the principal concern is that
a private third party, who has no legal interest in the property other
than the TFC, will receive the benefit of the covenant-one percent
of all future sales-while future buyers receive no benefit and bear
the burden of paying the one percent transfer fee.'
Numerous groups oppose the use of TFCs, including the
National Association of Realtors ("NAR") and the American Land
* C 2011 Christopher D. McEachran.
1. See Janet Morrissey, A Fee That Only Developers Could Love, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
12, 2010, at BU .
2. These covenants have been called "transfer fee covenants," N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 39A (Supp. 2010); "Capital Recovery Fee Instruments," FREEHOLD CAPITAL
PARTNERS, LEARN How CAPITAL RECOVERY FEE INSTRUMENTS CAN HELP YOU,
available at http://freeholdcapitalpartners.com/forms/freehold_brochure.pdf (last visited
Aug. 22, 2011); "transfer fee rights," Marjorie Ramseyer Bardwell & James Geoffrey
Durham, Transfer Fee Rights: Is the Lure of Sharing in Future Appreciation a Flawed
Concept?, PROB. & PROP., May-June 2007, at 24, 25; "transfer fees," Janice E. Carpi,
Transfer Fees: How to Make Money in Real Estate (and Render Your Purchaser's Title
Unmarketable) Without Really Trying, A.B.A., http://www.abanet.org/genpractice
/newsletter/lawtrends/0807/realestatecarpi.html (last visited Aug. 22, 2011); "resale fee
covenants," Morrissey, supra note 1 (internal quotations removed). For the purposes of
this Recent Development, the term transfer fee covenant ("TFC") will be used, as the
various names all identify the same type of instrument.
3. See Carpi, supra note 2.
4. Bardwell & Durham, supra note 2, at 25; Morrissey, supra note 1, at BUl.
5. See R. Wilson Freyermuth, Putting the Brakes on Private Transfer Fee Covenants,
PROB. & PROP., July-Aug. 2010, at 20, 22.
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Title Association ("ALTA").6 These groups have been lobbying state
legislatures across the country in an effort to prohibit the use of
TFCs, currently resulting in bans or restrictions in thirty-six states.7
On July 1, 2010, North Carolina added its name to the list of states
that prohibit TFCs in most circumstances.'
This Recent Development argues that by joining the national
movement against TFCs, North Carolina is implementing sound
public policy that clarifies and strengthens traditional property rights.
Part I discusses the principles of the TFC system, including the
alleged benefits and likely burdens created by its implementation.
Part II analyzes the recent North Carolina statute prohibiting TFCs
and discusses the changing property law principles that form the basis
of the new statute. More specifically, Part II highlights the distinction
between TFCs paid to private parties and those paid to community
associations as an illustration of the common law property principle
that covenants purporting to run with the land must be rational and
not against public policy.9 The new North Carolina statute
strengthens common law property principles already present in the
6. See, e.g., id. at 24; Jennifer Waters, New-Home Buyers: Be Aware of Transfer Fee,
WALL ST. J. (Oct. 31, 2010), http://online.wsj.com/article
/SB 10001424052748703414504575585020988882854.html?mod=googlenews-wsj#articleTab
s%3Darticle; Robbie Whelan, Battle Over Home Resale Fees Heads to Congress, WALL
ST. J. BLOG (Oct. 1, 2010, 9:48 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/developments/2010/10/01/batttle-
over-home-resale-fees-heads-to-congress/; About, COALITION TO STOP WALL STREET
HOME RESALE FEES, http://stophomeresalefees.org/about (last visited Aug. 22, 2011)
[hereinafter About, COALITION] (listing both NAR and ALTA as members of the
Coalition).
7. See Map: State Laws Against Wall StreetResale Fees, COALITION TO STOP WALL
STREET HOME RESALE FEES, http://stophomeresalefees.org/state-laws-against-wall-
street-home-resale-fees (last visited Aug. 22, 2011) [hereinafter Map, COALITION].
Recently, as a result of the Coalition's efforts, the Federal Housing Finance Agency
("FHFA") issued a proposed guidance that would prohibit federal loan agencies from
dealing in mortgages encumbered by TFCs. Private Transfer Fee Covenants, 75 Fed. Reg.
49,932 (Aug. 16, 2010). Morever, Congress also proposed a bill that would codify the
FHFA's guidance a little more than a month after it was issued. Homeowner Equity
Protection Act of 2010, H.R. 6260, 111th Cong. (2010). Because the Congressional session
ended without this bill being passed, it is not useful for analysis in this Recent
Development other than to point out the swiftness and effectiveness of the Coalition's
opposition to the use of TFCs.
8. See Transfer Fee Covenants Prohibited Act of 2010, 2010 N.C. Sess. Laws 245
(codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 39A (Supp. 2010)). However, under the definitions section
of the Act, transfer fees are allowed to be paid to a homeowners' association. N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 39A-2(i) (Supp. 2010).
9. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 3.2 (2000). This concept
replaces the "touch and concern" standard that has been articulated in the past. Id. § 3.2
cmt. a. This Recent Development argues that the courts have been interpreting the "touch
and concern" standard to mean "rational and not against public policy," as reflected in the
recent history of case law. See infra Part IlIl.A.
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state. It prevents the spread of a practice that would be against the
public policy of the state,"o while allowing homeowners' associations
to utilize the TFCs format to fund their operating costs." The second
half of this Recent Development discusses the principal legal
concerns facing the TFC model and how the North Carolina statute
addresses these concerns. Part III argues that TFCs do not meet the
traditional "touch and concern" standard that guides enforceability at
law.12 Part IV contends that even absent the new statute, TFCs are
against public policy-and therefore unenforceable at law-because
they restrain the free transferability of property." By codifying these
principles as a response to the specific threat of the TFC model, the
North Carolina General Assembly prevented future abuse while
maintaining common law principles of property transfer.
I. THE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF THE TRANSFER FEE
COVENANT
For decades, transfer fees have been used by developers and
homeowners alike to fund a variety of mutually beneficial entities,
including homeowners' associations 4  and nonprofits such as
environmental protection covenants" or conservation easements. 6
10. See infra Part II.B.
11. See Freyermuth, supra note 5, at 25; CMTY. ASS'NS INST., FOR THE COMMON
GOOD: USE OF COMMUNITY TRANSFER FEES BY COMMUNITY ASSOCIATIONS 2 (Sept.
27,2010),availableathttp://www.caionline.org/govt/news/Political%20H eadsUp
%20Public%20Document%20Library/CAI%20Survey%20Report%20Community%2OTr
ansfer%20Fees.pdf;.
12. Seeinfra Part III.
13. Seeinfra Part IV.
14. Victor Fava, Special Interest Groups Seek to Thwart Private Transfer Fee Funding,
NAT'L REAL EST. WATCH (Aug. 31, 2010), http://www.nationalrealestatewatch.com
/specialinterestsfava.html.
15. See Kenneth R. Harney, New Fee Could Be Boon to Developers, Surprise to
Buyers, WASH. POST, Mar. 6, 2010, at El (implying that homeowners' associations or
environmental protection covenants are the typical and accepted uses of transfer fees).
16. See Update on Charitable Transfer Fees and Call to Action, LAND TR. ALLIANCE
(Apr. 7, 2011), http://www.landtrustalliance.org/conservation/conservation-defense
/conservation-defense-news/update-on-charitable-transfer-fees-and-call-to (calling for
supporters to petition Congress to allow for land conservation easements to continue to
receive funds via transfer fees). Transfer fees that are payable to nonprofit organizations,
such as homeowners' associations and environmental covenants, typically would be valid
as they provide an ostensible benefit to the community. Freyermuth, supra note 5, at 25.
For example, builders in California have used transfer fees for twenty years as part of an
agreement to satisfy the demands of various environmental groups, funding the groups'
efforts in preserving open space in exchange for a lawsuit-free residential development
project. Kelly Quigley, Front Lines: Private Transfer Taxes, A New Buyer's Burden,
REALTORMAG (Sept. 1, 2007), http://www.realtor.org/rmoprint.nsf/pages
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TFCs paid to private third-party beneficiaries, however, are a more
recent development. The private TFC is a new type of servitude,"
different in purpose and effect from covenants that require transfer
fees to be paid to homeowners' associations each time the property is
resold. 9 During the ninety-nine year term of a TFC, the seller in all
future sales is required to pay a one percent fee to a trustee named in
the TFC.20 In return for his efforts tracking the property title, the
trustee is paid a small fee.2' The remaining proceeds are distributed to
the named beneficiaries. 2 2 This list nearly always includes the
developer, the trustee, and the "licensing" company that developed
the TFC business model.23 Sometimes, real estate agents or brokers as
well as local nonprofit organizations identified in the TFC document
share the future revenues. 24 If a future seller or buyer does not pay
the transfer fee, the TFC gives the trustee a lien on the property,
which may be foreclosed in order to secure the unpaid transfer fee.25
/frontlinesledesep07. Freehold Capital Partners, the leading advocate for the TFC model,
has attempted to include these traditional beneficiaries in an effort to maintain "touch and
concern" with the burdened land. See infra notes 50-53 and accompanying text.
17. See, e.g., Carpi, supra note 2 (informing the real estate community of the
"innovative new programs" known as TFCs as late as 2007).
18. A criticism of the TFC model is that it is "an attempt by the covenantor to retain
part of the fee simple title without having any right of possession presently or in the
future," thus creating a new estate in land "beyond those recognized at common law."
Bardwell & Durham, supra note 2, at 28. This critique further posits that such an attempt
to create a new interest in land would likely be rejected by any court asked to enforce it.
Id.
19. Traditional TFCs would benefit homeowners' associations or environmental
covenants. See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text. The private TFCs at issue in this
Recent Development benefit private third parties-developers, brokers, and licensors-
without benefiting the land. See infra Part III.B. For the remainder of this Recent
Development, "TFC" will be used to signify the private transfer fee covenant payable to
private third-party beneficiaries.
20. See, e.g., Bardwell & Durham, supra note 2, at 25; Freyermuth, supra note 5, at 21.
21. See Freyermuth, supra note 5, at 21.
22. See Bardwell & Durham, supra note 2, at 25; Freyermuth, supra note 5, at 21.
23. Freyermuth, supra note 5, at 21; see also Carolyn Clark Snipes, Private Transfer
Fees and Reconveyance Fee Instruments in North Carolina, REAL PROP., May 27, 2010,
available at http://realproperty.ncbar.org/newsletters/real-property-may-2010/private-
transfer-fees-and-reconveyance-fee-instruments-in-north-carolina.aspx (describing the
"typical" distribution of the transfer fee).
24. Freyermuth, supra note 5, at 21.
25. Id. For example:
[a]ssume that ABC Land Co. is developing a 500-lot residential subdivision,
known as Shady Acres, and wants to impose a [TFC] on each lot. As in any typical
development, [ABC] records a declaration within the chain of title for each lot in
Shady Acres. The declaration imposes a [TFC] that purports to run with each lot
and bind subsequent owners for a 99-year period. This covenant does not impose a
fee on the first sale, so when [ABC] sells a home to the initial homebuyer (whom
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A developer beginning to implement the TFC model may choose
to deal with the future income in one of two ways. First, a developer
may decide to keep the right to the transfer fee, collecting a portion
of the one percent fee upon every future resale.26 Second, the
developer may wish to sell the transfer fee right to a third party, who
may in turn decide to purchase many transfer fee rights, in order to
create a pool of future interests to sell as securities on the open
market. 27 The principal advocate for the practice of pooling and
securitization, and possibly the only party actively pooling transfer fee
rights in hopes of securitizing them, is Freehold Capital Partners.2 8
A. Freehold Capital Partners and the Benefits of Transfer Fee
Covenants
Texas developer Joseph B. Alderman, III's Freehold Capital
Partners ("Freehold") has become "the best known and most
controversial" promoter of the TFC model.29 Freehold claims that the
we will call Jones), Jones pays no transfer fee. The covenant, however, provides
that if Jones resells the home during the 99-year term of the covenant, Jones must
pay a fee equal to 1% of the purchase price.... If Jones does not pay the fee, the
declaration provides that the trustee has a lien on the land to secure the unpaid
transfer fees and can foreclose that lien (including by nonjudicial process, to the
extent permitted by other state law) to satisfy the fee payment obligation.
Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. The "inventor" of the TFC, Freehold Capital Partners, outlines a business plan
in which TFCs, or instruments, would be "aggregated into large 'pools' and securities
backed by the pool would then be issued." FREEHOLD CAPITAL PARTNERS, supra note 2;
Whelan, supra note 6.
28. FREEHOLD CAPITAL PARTNERS, supra note 2 ("Freehold and its partners have
created a tremendous portfolio of [TFC i]nstruments covering thousands of projects
nationwide, thus making income predictions a realistic possibility, which in turn makes
[securitization] feasible."); see, e.g., Kenneth R. Harney, Diverse Coalition Targets Home
Transfer Fees, WASH. POST, Aug. 7, 2010, at El (referring to Freehold Capital Partners as
the "principal advocate" of the TFC practice).
29. See Kenneth R. Harney, Proposed Ban on Private Transfer Fees Could Have
Hidden Costs, WASH. POST, Aug. 21, 2010, at El; Morrissey, supra note 1, at BUl.
Initially, the company was known as "Freehold Licensing" and the servitude was known as
a "Transfer Fee Instrument[]" (now changed to "Reconveyance Fee Instrument[]").
Robert Franco, Freehold Licensing, NKA Freehold Capital Partners, AtItAgain, SOURCE
OF TITLE (Feb. 27, 2010), https://www.sourceoftitle.com/blognode.aspx?uniq=568. One
blogger suggests that Alderman changed the name of the company and the instrument to
avoid the negative publicity it had garnered in the initial years of promoting the TFC
program. Id. However, the change in names has not altered the core concepts behind the
TFC program and has been accompanied by an expansion of the business plan, now
including plans to securitize the TFC interests and sell them on the open markets. Id. For
simplicity, the term Freehold will be used to describe the company regardless of the year
referenced.
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TFCs benefit consumers and "cash-strapped builders" alike.30 To
understand the developers' perspective, it is helpful to provide some
context. Builders and developers benefit from the use of TFCs in two
principal ways-TFCs increase capital at the outset of a project,
which helps offset increasing production costs, and TFCs guarantee a
future income stream that rewards builders and developers for the
expected increase in value of the homes they build.
In many parts of the country, before a large-scale residential
project can break ground, developers must first defend lawsuits from
private citizens' groups seeking to prevent the construction from
harming the environment." In addition to legal fees and settlement
sums, local governments also impose large impact fees on project
developers before construction can begin.32 These high costs can
inhibit developers from beginning new projects. Consequently, some
developers have begun including TFCs in their development plans in
an attempt to offset the costs of beginning these new projects."
Furthermore, for many years, some builders and developers have
argued that they were "creating wealth for everyone but themselves,"
contending that, as the builders and initial sellers, they do not receive
adequate compensation for the future increase in value of the homes
they build.34 They further argue that this lack of compensation has
become even more pronounced during hard economic times, as they
often do not make a profit from the sale of a newly constructed home
that will sell in the future for much more than the original purchase
price." These developers see the TFC model as a "small honorarium
for creating [the] value for all who come later."36
Alderman and the people at Freehold recognize that developers
are desperate for a way to increase profits and have responded by
aggressively pitching the TFC program to builders and developers
across the country." Developers have responded to these efforts,
turning to the Freehold TFC model as an alternative to the traditional
real estate transaction, in which 100% of these costs are placed onto
30. Harney, supra note 15, at E1.
31. Quigley, supra note 16.
32. Id
33. See Morrissey, supra note 1.
34. Al Heavens, Beware Developer Fees for Resale of a Home, PHILLY.COM (Oct. 3,
2010), http://www.philly.com/inquirer/real estate/20101003_On-the HouseBeware
developerfees forresale-of_a home.html.
35. See id.
36. Id
37. See Morrissey, supra note 1.
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the initial buyer.38 Using Freehold's TFC model, the developer can
argue that he is distributing the development costs to all future
owners over the lifetime of the property while offering a discount to
the initial buyer." The TFC model presents developers with a
"creative" method of financing new developments, as the steady
"trickle of cash" from the future payment of the fees can be used as
collateral for a loan to finance future developments, which then leads
to more fees being paid.40 Alternatively, TFCs can allow developers
to get cash up front if TFCs are pooled together and packaged into
securities backed by the income stream generated by the transfer fees
and sold on Wall Street.4 1 Using either method, TFCs provide a
needed source of income for developers, allowing them to lower
initial sale prices, pay down bank loans, and restart failed projects.42
From the buyer's perspective, accepting the one percent transfer
fee allows the buyer to negotiate for a lower initial sale price, which
reduces carrying costs and allows the buyer to reallocate the money
to pay off other current debts.4 3 In its promotional material, Freehold
offers the potential buyer two sample options: (1) buy the house for
$250,000, or (2) buy the same house for $245,000 plus a one percent
transfer fee when the house is sold." When faced with such a choice,
the rational buyer would presumably choose the second option.45 In
return for accepting the one percent transfer fee, the buyer can buy
38. See FREEHOLD CAPITAL PARTNERS, supra note 2.
39. FREEHOLD CAPITAL PARTNERS, supra note 2; Tom McPeak, The Economics of
Private Transfer Fee Covenants, FIERCEFINANCE (Apr. 22,2010), http://www
.fiercefinance.com/press-releases/economics-private-transfer-fee-covenants;
Quigley, supra note 16.
40. Morrissey, supra note 1.
41. Id. ("Freehold has begun shopping the idea of securitizing the resale fees, much as
subprime loans were packaged and sold to investors."); Whelan, supra note 6. Freehold
claims to be "the owners of an estimated $488 billion in real estate projects nationwide,"
which it plans to group together into large "pools of transfer fees" which can be
securitized, essentially "creating bonds based on future cash flows that can be sold to
deep-pocket money managers." Harney, supra note 15.
42. See Harney, supra note 15; Fava, supra note 14. However, not all developers are
on board with the Freehold TFC model. Many are concerned that the program may turn
out to be illegal. Quigley, supra note 16. One executive of the National Association of
Homebuilders, a group whose members have already signed up with Freehold, stated that
while TFCs are a "very creative concept," they are "largely untested and controversial
politically." Harney, supra note 15.
43. McPeak, supra note 39, Once the TFC is disclosed to the rational buyer,
"economic theory suggests that buyers armed with the facts will not pay the same for a
home with a transfer fee as they will pay for the same home without the transfer fee. It
would be illogical to argue otherwise." Id.
44. FREEHOLD CAPITAL PARTNERS, supra note 2.
45. See McPeak, supra note 39.
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for less and sell for less, which is a "competitive advantage";"6 save on
closing costs and sales expenses; and secure a lower mortgage rate. 47
Supporters of the TFC model are careful to note that a buyer who
does not agree to the TFC may simply go elsewhere, as there are
numerous housing options for those who prefer to pay 100% of
development costs at the outset. The TFC model presents an
alternative to the traditional real estate transaction, which results in a
lower initial and resale price, giving the buyer a "competitive
advantage .49
In addition to the benefits to prospective buyers, local
communities also benefit from the TFC program. The Freehold TFC
model almost always requires that a portion of the income from a
TFC, usually five percent, be allocated to a community-oriented
nonprofit organization.so These nonprofits are distinct from
homeowners' associations, which have traditionally utilized a similar
transfer fee payment to fund their operating costs." The nonprofits
identified in the Freehold TFCs are not directly associated with the
residential community like a homeowners' association, but instead
provide long-term funding for "clean air, clean water, green space,
literacy, affordable housing and similar endeavors that help build
better communities and enhance the quality of life" locally where the
Freehold TFCs are implemented.52 According to the company's
promotional material, "Freehold's system combines economic
incentives for property developers with a charitable component,
which means that [TFC] income generated by Freehold is estimated
to far outpace the income stream generated by other types of transfer
fees imposed on a pure 'non-profit' basis."53
46. FREEHOLD CAPITAL PARTNERS, supra note 2 (characterizing the ability to buy
and sell for less as a "competitive advantage"). However, there are those who would argue
that a lower resale value is not desirable at all, and that the imposition of a TFC reduces
the incentive for a buyer to invest in their home, as they know that they will not realize the
full potential of their investment due to the future transfer fee payment. Snipes, supra note
23.
47. See McPeak, supra note 39.
48. See FREEHOLD CAPITAL PARTNERS, supra note 2.
49. Id.
50. McPeak, supra note 39.
51. SeeFreyermuth, supra note 5, at 21-22.
52. Freehold Capital Partners Announces $348,000,000.00 North Carolina Project, PR
NEWSWIRE (May 25, 2010), http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/freehold-capital-
partners-announces-34800000000-north-carolina-project-94807854.html; see FREEHOLD
CAPITAL PARTNERS, supra note 2; McPeak, supra note 39.
53. FREEHOLD CAPITAL PARTNERS, supra note 2.
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B. Transfer Fee Covenants Face Opposition on a National Scale
As intently as Freehold and its supporters advocate for the
widespread use of the TFC model, the opposition, led by NAR and
ALTA is advocating against the use of TFCs.54 Kurt Pfotenhauer,
chief executive of ALTA, expressed the groups' principal concerns:
TFCs are "bad public policy and bad for consumers."" This is
because the "private transfer fees hinder the safe and secure transfer
of property[,] . .. provide no service or benefit to homeowners, and
raise the cost of homeownership."s" ALTA believes that TFCs are
"designed to generate additional revenue for investors at the expense
of consumers.""
In recent years, as the use of TFCs has increased, both NAR and
ALTA have adopted similar policy statements against the use and
enforcement of private TFCs that essentially echo the sentiments
expressed by Mr. Pfotenhauer." Beginning in 2008, ALTA and NAR
teamed together to lobby state legislatures to ban TFCs.59 This effort
proved to be very successful, resulting in legislative changes that
restrict or ban TFCs in thirty-six states."o Following their success at
the state level, NAR and ALTA took the battle to the federal level by
joining forces with several consumers' rights organizations and labor
unions to form the Coalition to Stop Wall Street Home Resale Fees
("the Coalition") in late July of 2010.61 The Coalition views TFCs as
"predatory legal instruments that threaten American homeowners by
forcing them to pay a premium for the right to sell their own property
54. See Harney, supra note 28.
55. Id.
56. AL TA Supports FHFA Proposal to Ban Private Transfer Fees, AM. LAND TITLE
ASS'N (Oct. 19, 2010) (quoting Kurt Pfotenhauer, ALTA Chief Executive Officer), http://
www.alta.org/news/news.cfm?newslD=12355.
57. Id.
58. See Freyermuth, supra note 5, at 24 ("ALTA's statement provides that 'these
covenants provide no benefit to consumers or the public, but rather cost consumers
money, complicate the safe, efficient and legal transfer of real estate, and depress home
prices.' . . . The NAR's statement argues that 'such fees decrease affordability, serve no
public purpose, and provide no benefit to property purchasers, or the community in which
the property is located.' ").
59. See Fava, supra note 14. In 2008, the California legislature decided to permit TFCs
so long as they were properly disclosed. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1098, 1098.5 (West 2011).
Following their defeat in California, NAR and ALTA began lobbying other states to ban
TFCs. Fava, supra note 14.
60. See The Issue, COALITION TO STOP WALL STREET HOME RESALE FEES, http://
www.stophomeresalefees.org/issue (last visited Aug. 22, 2011) [hereinafter The Issue,
COALITION].
61. See Margaret Jackson, Resale Fees Under Attack, DENVER POST, July 30, 2010, at
5B; AbouA COALITION, supra note 6.
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and by burdening the land without benefiting the land."62 The
Coalition's ultimate goal is to lobby the federal government to enact
legislation that would outlaw "capital recovery fees," or TFCs.63
II. NORTH CAROLINA JOINS THE NATIONAL MOVEMENT TO BAN
TRANSFER FEE COVENANTS
In 2010, North Carolina and eleven other states passed laws that
prohibit or severely restrict the use of TFCs, increasing the total
number of states prohibiting or restricting TFCs at that time to
eighteen.' On July 1, 2010, the North Carolina General Assembly
passed section 39A of the General Statutes of North Carolina entitled
"Transfer Fee Covenants Prohibited."" The new statute restates
North Carolina's public policy regarding real property transfers and
specifically prohibits private TFCs, while allowing homeowners'
associations and environmental covenants to utilize the TFC model to
collect funds. 6 Even though the TFC model had not become standard
practice in North Carolina, opponents of the fees, such as the
Coalition, lobbied for the prohibitive law to prevent the TFC model
from becoming "more commonplace."67 While opponents may
62. The Issue, COALITION, supra note 60.
63. See Whelan, supra note 6. Freehold Capital Partners prefers the term "Capital
Recovery Fees," presumably because of the more positive business connotation it carries
as compared to the "transfer fee covenant" term used in this article or the more negative
"Home Resale Fees" used by the Coalition. See The Issue, COALITION, supra note 60;
FREEHOLD CAPITAL PARTNERS, supra note 2.
64. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 39A (Supp. 2010); Heavens, supra note 34; seeFava, supra note
14 (describing the lobbying efforts by the Coalition in several states to prohibit TFCs). As
of August 2011, three more states had passed laws prohibiting or restricting the use of
TFCs, bringing the total to thirty-six. See Map, COALITION, supra note 7; North Dakota
Becomes 27th State to Restrict Wall Street Home Resale Fees, COALITION TO STOP WALL
STREET HOME RESALE FEES (Apr. 26, 2011), http://www.stophomeresalefees.org/north-
dakota-becomes-27th-state-restrict-wall-street-home-resale-fees.
65. See Transfer Fee Covenants Prohibited Act of 2010, 2010 N.C. Sess. Laws 245
(codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 39A (Supp. 2010)).
66. See§ 39A (Supp.2010).
67. Paul Johnson, New Law Bans Real Estate Transfer Royalty Fees, HIGH POINT
ENTERPRISE, July 9, 2010, available athttp://www.hpe.com/view/full-story/8616038/article-
New-law-bans-real-estate-transfer-royalty-fees?instance=mainarticle. State Senator Katie
Dorsett, of Guilford County, said she "felt [the ban on TFCs] was something that would
be good public policy," adding that homeowners "shouldn't have to pay that fee forever."
Id. A spokesman for the N.C. Justice Center added that TFCs are a "deceitful practice ...
one that's not been common in the real estate markets in the United States historically. It
hurts consumers and real estate values." Id. These comments mirror those of legislators in
other states where TFCs have recently been banned. In Michigan, a state representative
described TFCs as "utter nonsense that strips away hard-earned equity from
homeowners." Aaron Kessler, U.S. Out to Curb Resale Fees, SARASOTA HERALD TRIB.,
Sept. 20, 2010, at D9. Similarly in Pennsylvania, State Representative Sue Helm described
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criticize the Coalition for acting with self-interested motives and
questionable tactics,"8 their push to ban private TFCs has support
from the legal community as well as government agencies and the
common law. 9
A. An Explanation ofNorth Carolina's Statute
The North Carolina TFC prohibition statuteo begins by stating
that the public policy of the state "favors the marketability of real
property and the transferability of interests in real property free from
title defects, unreasonable restraints on alienation, and covenants or
servitudes that do not touch and concern the property."" It goes on to
state that "transfer fee covenant[s]" violate the public policy of North
Carolina by "impairing the marketability of title to the affected real
property" and constitute an "unreasonable restraint on alienation and
transferability of property, regardless of the duration of the covenant
or the amount of the transfer fee set forth in the covenant."7 2
TFCs as " 'unfair to the home buyer and home seller and only hurts the real estate
industry, which is trying to make a recovery.... [M]ost home buyers are unaware this fee
even exists.'" Jason Scott, Bill to Ban Private Real Estate Transfer Fees Heads to Corbet;
CPBJNOW.COM (June 16, 2011, 12:21 PM), http://centralpennbusiness.com/article
/20110616/CPBJ01/110619855. And in Ohio, Senator Seitz described the dangers of TFCs
as he introduced a bill to prohibit them, "The problem here, ladies and gentlemen, is that
these 99-year covenants create a cloud on title, they are going to be packaged up,
comingled together, and sold through securitization plans. And frankly folks, that kind of
stuff is why construction is in the dumps today." Robert Franco, Ohio Senate Votes
Unanimously to Ban Private Transfer Fee Covenants, SOURCE OF TITLE (May 28, 2010),
http://www.sourceoftitle.com/blog_node.aspx?uniq=621.
68. See Press Release, Job Coal. Org., Coalition Threatens Transfer Fee Funding for
Non-Profits (Sept. 4, 2010), available athttp://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases
/coalition-threatens-transfer-fee-funding-for-non-profits-102227279.html ("The NAR fears
that Realtors will be asked to absorb the transfer fee. [ALTA] fears that they will miss the
fee [during their title search] and have to pay claims.... [T]hese two groups have
launched an all-out war on this funding source, with total disregard for the impact on
consumers and non-profits."); Fava, supra note 14 (describing the transformation of a
North Carolina bill originally designed to create early organizational sessions into a ban
on transfer fees at the last minute, with "neither study nor debate" as "reminiscent of the
days when ... the NAR and ALTA could ask for practically any political favor and be
assured that it would be granted").
69. See generally Private Transfer Fee Covenants, 75 Fed. Reg. 49,932, 49,932 (Aug.
16, 2010) (expressing concern that TFCs either are directed toward private use or are not
in line with homeowners' association purposes); Bardwell & Durham, supra note 2
(questioning the legality of TFCs); Freyermuth, supra note 5 (explaining how TFCs
conflict with the common law "touch and concern" standard).
70. 2010 N.C. Sess. Laws 245; see Johnson, supra note 67.
71. § 39A-l(a) (Supp. 2010).
72. § 39A-1(b) (Supp. 2010) (emphasis added).
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Subsection two of section 39A defines many of the terms in the
statute. First, the statute defines a "transfer fee" as a fee payable
upon the transfer of an interest in real property that may be
expressed as a fixed amount or a percentage.74 A "transfer fee
covenant" is simply a declaration purporting to require the payment
of a transfer fee to the declarant upon the subsequent transfer of an
interest in real property.75 From this broad definition, the statute
carves out several important exceptions, stating clearly what will not
be considered a transfer fee under the new statute. Several of the
exceptions can be summarized as the fees typically paid upon closing
in addition to the purchase price, such as the real estate broker's
commission, attorney's fees, and title insurance premiums. 7 In
addition to these expected exceptions, the statute also exempts "[a]ny
reasonable fee payable by the original transferee to a unit owners'
association . . . as long as no portion of the fee is required to be
passed through to a third party" and "[a]ny fee payable as part of a
conservation or preservation agreement ....
Having defined what a TFC is and is not under the statute,
section 39A states that any TFC or lien filed to enforce a TFC "shall
not run with the title to real property and is not binding on or
enforceable at law or in equity .. . . Furthermore, any person who
records a TFC or files a lien to secure payment of the TFC shall be
liable for any fees and damages that result from the TFC's presence.so
Finally, the statute applies prospectively to any TFC recorded or lien
filed after the effective date, July 1, 2010.' Importantly, the General
Assembly makes clear that "[n]othing in this act shall be interpreted
to mean that a transfer fee covenant recorded prior to the effective
date of this act is valid or enforceable."82
73. § 39A-2 (Supp. 2010).
74. § 39A-2(2) (Supp. 2010).
75. § 39A-2(3) (Supp. 2010).
76. § 39A-2(2)(a)-(j) (Supp. 2010).
77. See§ 39A-2(2) (Supp. 2010).
78. § 39A-2(2)(i)-(j) (Supp. 2010); NC. Bans Private Transfer Fees, THE LEGAL
DESCRIPTION (June 29, 2010), http://www.thelegaldescription.com/ME 2/Audiences
/dirmod.asp?sid=27A4314B48C54B57974C81C84B 11 ID8A&nm=&type=news&mod=Ne
ws&mid=ACAC9426E 1214D 159500CBCA87ADAFBD&tier=3&nid=EC3BE21 1B55D42
D7AB4AEOB4D4EO7F70.
79. § 39A-3(a) (Supp. 2010).
80. § 39A-3(b) (Supp. 2010).
81. Transfer Fee Covenants Prohibited Act of 2010, § 3, 2010 N.C. Sess. Laws 245, 247
(codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 39A (Supp. 2010)).
82. § 3, 2010 N.C. Sess. Laws at 247.
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B. Putting the Statute in Perspective
The statement of public policy relating to real property found in
section 39A is not actually a statement of public policy, but a
restatement of North Carolina's policy toward real property found in
the 1973 Real Property Marketable Title Act." In 1973, the
legislature made it clear that all land in North Carolina should be
"made freely alienable and marketable," a sentiment that is reflected
in the 2010 public policy statement that "this State favors the
marketability of real property and the transferability of interests in
real property free from title defects."84 Following the statement of
public policy, section 39A lists the reasons why a TFC violates the
state's policy-the covenants "impair[] the marketability of title" and
constitute an unreasonable restraint on the transferability of
property, regardless of the amount of the fee or the duration of the
covenant." This language closely resembles the 1973 statement of
public policy that said, "[n]onpossessory interests in real property ...
are prolific producers of litigation to clear and quiet title."8 6 Litigation
impairs the marketability of title, and "cause[s] delays in real
property transactions," thus restraining its transferability." As will be
shown below, the modern TFC is clearly a "nonpossessory interest[]
in real property" of the type described in the 1973 policy statement.
Thus, even though the 2010 statement of policy was written as a direct
response to the question of TFCs, it does not differ greatly, if at all,
from the existing public policy regarding real property.
This consistency between the policy statements could prove to be
important in a case where the enforceability of a pre-2010 TFC is
challenged in court, as the Act explicitly states that it is not to be
applied retroactively. 89 In addition to maintaining the same public
83. § 39A-l(a) (Supp. 2010); seeN.C. GEN. STAT. § 47B-1 (2009).
84. § 47B-l(1); § 39A-l(a) (Supp. 2010). Black's Law Dictionary defines alienable as
"[c]apable of being transferred to the ownership of another; transferable." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 84 (9th ed. 2009).
85. § 39A-l(b) (Supp. 2010).
86. § 47B-l(2) to -(3).
87. Compare § 47B-1(3) (describing nonpossessory interests in property as restraining
the marketability of property by producing litigation that delays real property
transactions), with § 39A-l(b) (Supp. 2010) (describing TFCs as impairing marketability
and imposing unreasonable restraints on the alienation and transferability of real property
in a similar manner as § 47B-1).
88. § 47B-l(2); see infra note 135 and accompanying text.
89. See Transfer Fee Covenants Prohibited Act of 2010, § 3, 2010 N.C. Sess. Laws 245,
247 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 39A (Supp. 2010)) (stating that the Act is effective
"1when it becomes law" and applies prospectively); see also Chris Burti, 2010 Legislative
Update, STATEWIDE TITLE NEWSL. AND LEGAL MEMORANDUM (Aug. 1, 2010), http://
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policy stance as before, the General Assembly offers courts guidance
when considering the validity of pre-existing TFCs by stating
"[n]othingin this act shall be interpreted to mean that a transfer fee
covenant recorded prior to the effective date of this act is valid or
enforceable."'o This language suggests that the General Assembly did
not believe a TFC should have been found valid or enforceable even
before the new law took effect." Additionally, the Act states that the
statute is effective against "any [TFC] that is recorded after the
effective day of this act; [and] (ii) any lien that is filed to enforce a
[TFC] that is recorded after the effective date of this act."92 Based on
the structure of this sentence, it appears that the drafters intended for
a lien recorded after the enactment to be unenforceable.9 3 This claim
is bolstered by section 39A-3(a), which states that "[a]ny [TFC] or
any lien that is filed to enforce a [TFC] ... is not binding on or
enforceable at law or in equity against any subsequent owner,
purchaser, or mortgagee ... .9 Furthermore, the Act explicitly
creates liability for damages against "[a] person who records a [TFC]"
and anyone who "files a lien ... to secure payment of a transfer
fee."" Thus, section 39A will likely preclude judicial enforcement of
pre-existing TFCs in addition to all future TFCs.
While the public policy behind the new statute is important, the
definition of "transfer fee" represents a choice by the General
Assembly to allow certain traditionally accepted covenants and fees
while prohibiting TFCs.96 Within the definition of what is a transfer
fee are several clear statements of what is not considered a transfer
fee.97 Among these, there are two exceptions that differ substantially
from the typical real estate transaction fees-a fee payable to an
owners' association (so long as no portion of the fee is required to go
through a third party) and a fee payable as part of a conservation or
preservation agreement." These two exceptions are recommended by
www.statewidetitle.com/newsletterarticle.asp?Article=314 ("The Act is not retroactive, so
the enforceability of existing covenants may yet be tested in the courts.").
90. § 2, 2010 N.C. Sess. Laws at 247 (emphasis added).
91. See Burti, supra note 89 (noting that it was the General Assembly's "clear intent
not to validate such covenants").
92. § 3, 2010 N.C. Sess. Laws at 247.
93. See Burti, supra note 89 (recognizing "that filing a lien to enforce a pre-existing
covenant after the effective date of the act may be prohibited").
94. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 39A-3(a) (Supp. 2010) (emphasis added).
95. § 39A-3(b) (Supp. 2010).
96. § 39A-2(2)(a)-(j) (Supp. 2010).
97. Id.
98. § 39A-2(2)(i)-(j) (Supp. 2010).
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the NAR/ALTA Model Private Transfer Fee statute" and can be
found in the TFC-banning statutes of several other states-including
1103Illinois,o Florida,' 1 Ohio, 02 Arizona,"o and Washington.'" These
covenants, especially ones that might impose a transfer fee payable to
an owners' association for the purpose of financing association
operations and/or maintenance of common amenities, would typically
have satisfied the common law's "touch and concern" standard, which
is explicitly referenced in section 39A-1(a), as well as in the model
statute presented by the NAR/ALTA.'0 By following the model
statute proposed by the NAR and ALTA, North Carolina effectively
resolved the legal and public policy concerns surrounding TFCs while
still allowing for TFCs to be used to benefit community associations.
A statute that simply banned all TFCs would not allow owners'
associations to utilize this valuable source of funding, which
associations have used for more than a decade to fund their operating
budgets, capital projects, and reserve funds.o6 North Carolina has
99. See Freyermuth, supra note 5, at 25 (noting that section 1(a)(4)(C)-(D) of the
model statute exempts association fees and environmental covenants from the definition
of a transfer fee).
100. 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 155/10 (2011).
101. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 689.28(c)(7)-(l0) (West Supp. 2011).
102. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5301.057(A)(3)(g)-(h) (LexisNexis Supp. 2011).
103. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-442(C)(3) (Supp. 2010).
104. 2011 Wash. Sess. Laws 398. Several other states exempt homeowners' associations
from the TFC definition but not environmental covenants or conservation agreements.
See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 10-708 (West 2011); MINN. STAT. § 513.73
(2011); OR. REV. STAT. § 93.269 (2011); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §5.107 (West 2011);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-1-46 (West 2011).
105. SeeN.C. GEN. STAT. § 39A-I(a) (Supp. 2010) (proclaiming a public policy interest
against "covenants or servitudes that do not touch and concern the property"). The part of
the NAR/ALTA model statute section referred to is section 1(b)(1): "[t]he public policy
of this State favors the transferability of interests in real property free from ... covenants
or servitudes that do not touch and concern the property." Freyermuth, supra note 5, at 25
(emphasis added).
106. CMTY. ASS'NS INST., supra note 11, at 1. A survey was conducted by the
Community Associations Institute ("CAI"), a membership organization representing the
interests of more than sixty million community association members across the United
States. Id. It was conducted largely in response to the recent FHFA guidance that
proposed to prohibit federal home loan banks from investing in any mortgage encumbered
by a TFC, including one that goes directly to an owners' association. Id.; Private Transfer
Fee Covenants, 75 Fed. Reg. 49,932, 49,933-34 (Aug. 16, 2010). As an example, look no
further than the battle over transfer fees in Hawaii in 2009. As a response to a call for
comments on transfer fee legislation that was arguably overbroad or unclear in its
definition of what would and would not be considered a transfer fee, the co-chair of the
Hawaii Legislative Action Committee ("LAC") of the CAI wrote that the LAC
supports the intent and purpose of [the proposed legislation] to prevent
developers from using so-called transfer fees from every future sale of homes and
apartments in common interest communities as a "cash cow" to generate income
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struck a balance by eliminating TFCs that benefit only private third
parties while allowing traditional"o' uses of TFCs to continue.
The plain language of North Carolina's recent statute clearly
prohibits the use of TFCs going forward.'o It is also likely that the
statute will be interpreted as invalidating pre-existing TFCs.' 9 Even
so, in the event that courts are asked to evaluate the validity of a
TFC, they would not need to rely on an overly technical reading of
the statute or legislative intent to find a TFC to be unenforceable.
This is because the statute, by reiterating the pre-existing public
policy of the state and reemphasizing the importance of the "touch
and concern" standard,"o codifies common law property principles,
prohibiting the future use of a covenant that would likely have been
found unenforceable at law and against public policy.
III. TRANSFER FEE COVENANTS ARE UNENFORCEABLE AT LAW
The entire premise of the TFC model is based on the assumption
that a buyer will voluntarily pay the one percent fee when reselling
the home or be forced to pay it in order to remove a lien imposed by
the trustee of the TFC."' However, if the TFC is not legally
enforceable, there is nothing preventing a future buyer from simply
ignoring the TFC in the title and refusing to pay the one percent fee
to the trustee. Before the recent wave of legislation prohibiting
private TFCs, 112 the enforceability of a TFC had not been challenged
in any court. The validity of a TFC may remain a question in states
that have not banned the instrument, as well as in cases addressing
pre-existing TFCs in states that have banned the future use of TFCs,
long after the initial sale. The LAC is concerned, however, that the broad language
of the bill may inadvertently include within its scope various kinds of usual and
customary fees that are collected when homes and apartments within common
interest communities are conveyed.
Letter from Philip L. Lahne, Co-Chair, Haw. Legislative Action Comm. of the CAI, to
Hon. Robert N. Herkes, Chair, House Comm. on Consumer Prot. & Commerce (Feb. 3,
2009), available athttp://www.capitol.hawaii.gov/session2010/testimony/HB874
TESTIMONYCPC_A _02-04-09_.pdf.
107. See infira Part III.A.
108. Transfer Fee Covenants Prohibited Act of 2010, § 3, 2010 N.C. Sess. Laws 245, 247
(codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 39A (Supp. 2010)).
109. See supra notes 89-95 and accompanying text.
110. See infra Part III.A.
S111. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
112. See supra Part I.B. (describing the national movement by the Coalition); see also
supra Part It (describing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 39A).
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such as North Carolina."' Because the prohibitive statutes are not
applicable retroactively, the principal legal challenge to the already
existing TFCs is that the covenant does not "touch and concern" the
land.114
A. A BriefHistory ofthe "Touch and Concern" Standard in North
Carolina
Under common law principles, a covenant did not "bind a
successor to the original covenantor unless both the benefit and the
burden of the covenant 'touched and concerned' land.""' This
principle was famously set out in Neponsit Property Owners'Ass'n v.
Emigrant Industrial Savings Bank,"' where both the benefit and
burden of an affirmative covenant to pay money for the upkeep of
roads and parks in the community were said to touch and concern the
land, and thus were found to "run with the land" and bind the
subsequent property owners to perform the covenant."' Today,
similar covenants are typically found in homeowners' association lot
assessment covenants, where each lot in a community is required to
pay a sum to fund the operation of the association that maintains
common facilities."' Since Neponsit was decided in 1938, challenges
to "lot assessment covenants" have failed, as most courts regularly
find both the "benefit and the burden" to "touch and concern the
land"-a finding that requires subsequent owners of the land to abide
by the covenant.119
Just as in Neponsit, North Carolina law requires that, for a real
covenant to run with the land, both the benefit and the burden must
touch and concern the land.'2 0 If both the benefit and burden do not
113. See supra notes 89-95 and accompanying text (describing the likelihood that a
pre-existing TFC would not be found valid based on the language of the North Carolina
statute). However, there are those who believe that the statute does not affect TFCs that
predate the 2010 statute. See Michael Hunter, NC. Law Banning Transfer Fees is
Questioned, THE CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Sept. 11, 2010, at H2 ("[A] plain reading of the
wording of [section 39A] leads me to believe that the ban is not retroactive, and that
transfer fees contained in [covenants, conditions, and restrictions] recorded before July 1,
2010 are still legal and may be enforced by filing a lien against the subject property if the
fee is not paid at closing.").
114. Bardwell & Durham, supra note 2, at 29.
115. Freyermuth, supra note 5, at 21.
116. 15 N.E.2d 793 (N.Y. 1938).
117. Id. at 797.
118. Freyermuth, supra note 5, at 21.
119. Id. at 22.
120. MidSouth Golf, L.L.C. v. Fairfield Harbourside Condo. Ass'n, 187 N.C. App. 22,
30-31, 652 S.E.2d 378, 384 (2007).
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touch and concern the land, the covenant is deemed a personal
covenant, 12 1 which does not bind successors to the original
covenantor.122 The North Carolina Court of Appeals recently applied
the "touch and concern standard" in MidSouth Golf L.L.C. v.
Fairfield Harbourside Condominium Assn.123 The court held that an
amenity fee covenant, which required homeowners to pay a fee for
recreational facilities regardless of their use of said facilities, did not
benefit the homeowners' land and thus did not touch and concern the
land. 124 The court in MidSouth took much of its language from an
earlier decision, Raintree Corp. v. Rowe.'25 There, the court held that
an affirmative covenant to pay country club dues, the facilities of
which were not "connected with, or attached to the [homeowners']
land in any way," was not connected with the homeowners' use of the
land and thus did not touch and concern the land. 126 Both cases
reinforce the theme that an affirmative covenant to pay money that
does not benefit the land will not be found to touch and concern the
land.127
B. The Application ofNorth Carolina's "Touch and Concern"
Standard to the TFC Model
TFCs are not "lot assessment covenant[s]" like the type
envisioned in Neponsit.128 The TFC model proposed by Freehold is
payable only to private third parties, not to a homeowners'
association.129 In the TFC model, the covenant purports to bind
subsequent owners to pay a one percent transfer fee, the burden,
which will benefit the developer, licensor, and trustee.o This aspect
121. Id. at 30, 652 S.E.2d at 384.
122. Id.; see Caullett v. Stanley Stilwell & Sons, Inc., 170 A.2d 52, 56 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1961); Bremmeyer Excavating, Inc. v. McKenna, 721 P.2d 567, 568-69 (Wash.
Ct. App. 1986); see also Freyermuth, supra note 5, at 22 (citing Garland v. Rosenshein, 649
N.E.2d 756, 758 (Mass. 1995)).
123. 187 N.C. App. at 32-38, 652 S.E.2d at 385-89.
124. Id. at 36, 652 S.E.2d at 388.
125. 38 N.C. App. 664, 248 S.E.2d 904 (1978).
126. Id. at 670, 248 S.E. 2d at 908-09.
127. See Snipes, supra note 23, at 5.
128. Freyermuth, supra note 5, at 22.
129. Id.; see also FREEHOLD CAPITAL PARTNERS, supra note 2 (describing the process
by which "you," the developer, receive income from future sales, which you may either
keep or sell on the common markets).
130. See Freyermuth, supra note 5, at 22; Snipes, supra note 23, at 5. It is likely that the
proponents of the TFC model would argue that by requiring that five percent of the
transfer fee be donated to a local charity or nonprofit, the TFC is in fact benefiting the
community. Snipes, supra note 23, at 5. However, as the charity or nonprofit is not
required to actually benefit the specific lot, the subdivision, or even the city in which the
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of the TFC makes it less like a real covenant, which runs with the
land, and more like a personal covenant, which does not."' Like in
MidSouth and Raintree, fees due under a TFC are not connected with
the land.13 2 The benefit received by the initial owner of the property
encumbered by the TFC is that, presumably, the purchase price is
discounted to reflect the presence of the TFC."' However, these
savings are likely to be lost when the initial owner is forced to lower
the purchase price for the next buyer, in order to reflect the presence
of the TFC.1'34 The burden of the one percent fee would run with the
land, but the benefit would remain with the developer, licensor, and
trustee, as each subsequent buyer would receive the same "benefit"
of buying low and then selling low, in addition to the one percent fee
future buyers would pay to the beneficiaries of the TFC.13 s
The statement of public policy found in section 39A-1(a)
explicitly states that covenants or servitudes that do not "touch and
concern the property" are to be disfavored.136 This seems to indicate
that the General Assembly intends for the courts to apply the
common law "touch and concern" standard, as opposed to the more
modern contract-oriented approach favored by the Restatement
(Third) of Property."' Section 39A's restatement of public policy,
combined with the established case law of North Carolina, suggest a
North Carolina court would likely find a TFC to be a personal
covenant, enforceable only between the initial covenantor and
covenantee, which does not run with the land.'38 The TFC model
claims to be a "true win-win scenario" for developers and
homeowners."' However, it is the developer, licensor, and trustee
group that are attempting to win twice by keeping the benefit of the
fee while retaining none of the burden.'40
property is located, courts would likely find that the benefit does not touch and concern
the land, and that "[tlhe covenant is merely a personal one that is unenforceable against
those not party to the [TFC]." Id.
131. See MidSouth Golf, L.L.C. v. Fairfield Harbourside Condo. Ass'n, 187 N.C. App.
22, 30, 652 S.E.2d 378, 384 (2007) (finding a covenant that did not touch and concern the
land was not a real covenant and did not run with the land as intended).
132. Snipes, supra note 23, at 5.
133. SeeFREEHOLD CAPITAL PARTNERS, supra note 2.
134. See Snipes, supra note 23, at 3.
135. See id.; Freyermuth, supra note 5, at 22.
136. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 39A-l(a) (Supp. 2010).
137. § 39A-1(a) (Supp. 2010); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES §§ 3.1-
3.2 (2000); see infra Part II.C. for a discussion of the new standard suggested by the
Restatement (Third) ofProperty: Servitudes.
138. See Freyermuth, supra note 5, at 22; Snipes, supra note 23, at 5.
139. FREEHOLD CAPITAL PARTNERS, supra note 2.
140. See Freyermuth, supra note 5, at 22; Snipes, supra note 23, at 5.
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C. The Restatement (Third) ofProperty and the "Touch and
Concern" Standard
The preceding analysis depends upon a court following the
traditional "touch and concern" standard, to which North Carolina
has adhered as recently as 2007.141 However, the 2000 Restatement
(Third) of Property: Servitudes explicitly supersedes the "touch and
concern" doctrine, stating that "[n]either the burden nor the benefit
of a covenant is required to touch or concern land in order for the
covenant to be valid as a servitude."l42 Instead, a servitude will be
valid unless it is illegal or unconstitutional or violates public
policy. Servitudes that are invalid because they violate public
policy include, but are not limited to: (1) a servitude that is
arbitrary, spiteful, or capricious; (2) a servitude that
unreasonably burdens a fundamental constitutional right; (3) a
servitude that imposes an unreasonable restraint on alienation
under § 3.4 or § 3.5 [of this Restatement]; (4) a servitude that
imposes an unreasonable restraint on trade or competition
under § 3.6 [of this Restatement]; and (5) a servitude that is
unconscionable under § 3.7 [of this Restatement]. 4 3
Essentially, the supersedure of the "touch and concern" standard
reformulates the initial inquiry and shifts the burden.'" Under the
current Restatement, the inquiry is whether the covenant violates
public policy, and the burden is on the party claiming the violation to
show that the covenant is one that should not run with the land.'45
The changes to the Restatement reflect the real reason most courts
have been striking down covenants under the "touch and concern"
standard-they found them to be against public policy.146
Supporters of the TFC model point to the Restatement for
support.147 The Restatement abandons the common law "touch and
concern" standard in favor of contract principles.148 Under the new
141. See supra Part Il.A. In the statement of public policy found in section 39A-1, the
North Carolina General Assembly reiterated its preference that covenants touch and
concern the land. § 39A-1(a) (Supp. 2010). However, other jurisdictions may follow the
Restatement (Third) more literally, where section 3.1 would have additional importance.
See infra note 143 and accompanying text.
142. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 3.2(2000).
143. Id. § 3.1 (emphasis added).
144. Id. § 3.2 cmt. a.
145. Id.
146. Id.§ 3.2 cmt. b.
147. Freyermuth, supra note 5, at 22.
148. Press Release, RJon Robins, Private Transfer Fee Covenants: An Overview of the
Three Applicable Servitude Regimes (Mar. 5, 2010), available athttp://newsblaze.com
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"reasonableness" standard set out in section 3.1, a covenant that only
imposes an indirect restraint on alienation 49 does not unreasonably
restrain alienability unless it lacks "rational justification.""so TFC
advocates such as Freehold have utilized this language, claiming that
TFCs are "reasonable," a de minimis one percent fee that has no
practical burden on alienability, and "rational," as the TFC benefits
both the developer and the buyer."' Therefore, in the opinion of
Freehold and its allies, a TFC-type servitude that meets general
contract requirements' will be presumptively valid unless the
covenant is illegal, unconstitutional, or against public policy.'53
This premise could be tested in states where the courts have
replaced the traditional "touch and concern" analysis with the
Restatement's new emphasis on public policy, provided that there is
no statutory prohibition against TFCs. In states where future TFCs
are prohibited, like North Carolina, courts may be required to
assess Freehold's public policy argument in a challenge to enforce a
pre-existing TFC.1'5 In North Carolina, this challenge would likely be
resolved using the "touch and concern" standard, as it does not
appear that North Carolina courts have adopted the Restatement's
approach to the "touch and concern" standard,"' especially
/story/2010030513591300043.pnw/topstory.html.
149. For example, such a covenant would limit the number of potential buyers or
reduce the amount for which the owner will be able to sell the property. RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 3.5 cmt. a (2000).
150. Freyermuth, supra note 5, at 22.
151. Id.
152. A restrictive covenant such as a TFC would be governed by the statute of frauds,
which requires that contracts to sell or convey real property be reduced to writing. N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 22-2 (Supp. 2010). Thus, the formalities can be analogized to "[a] contract
for the sale of real property" which "must meet the following requirements: be in writing;
signed by the parties; contain an adequate description of the real property; recite a sum of
consideration; and contain all key terms and conditions of the agreement." Rawls &
Assoc. v. Hurst, 144 N.C. App. 286, 290, 550 S.E.2d 219, 223 (2001); see also Press Release,
RJon Robins, supra note 148 (arguing that a TFC meets the general requirements of a
contract and thus should be valid unless shown to be "illegal, unconstitutional, or against
public policy").
153. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 3.1 (2000); Press Release,
RJon Robins, supra note 148.
154. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 39A (Supp. 2010).
155. The general validity of a pre-existing TFC could still be questioned in North
Carolina as well as any of the other states that prohibit future TFCs and any of the
fourteen states that have not enacted statutory prohibitions of the TFC practice. See supra
notes 89-95 and accompanying text.
156. Patrick A. Randolph, Jr., Quarterly Report on Current Developments in Real
Estate Law, A.B.A. REAL EST. Q. REP., Summer 2009, at 1, 11, available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/abarealestatequarterlyreport
/rpptpublications quarterlyreports_2009_SummerVO2_02.authcheckdam.pdf
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considering recent Court of Appeals decisions... and statutory
language1' that suggest the traditional "touch and concern" analysis
is still applicable in North Carolina. That said, public policy reasons
have long been behind "touch and concern" analysis,5 9 and a court, in
North Carolina or elsewhere, may be required to determine whether
TFCs should be void as to public policy.
IV. TRANSFER FEE COVENANTS ARE AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY
If a TFC is challenged in a jurisdiction that takes the more
modern approach of the Restatement (Tird) ofProperty, the inquiry
is shifted from the amorphous "touch and concern" standard to
whether the covenant is against public policy."'o North Carolina first
stated its public policy on transactions of real property in the 1973
Real Property Marketable Title Act.16 ' The themes of this Act were
reemphasized in the 2010 Transfer Fee Covenants Prohibited Act.16 2
Combining these two statements of public policy, it is clear that the
State of North Carolina favors land that is "freely alienable and
marketable" and disfavors nonpossessory interests with lengthy terms
that lead to litigation to quiet title, which ultimately cause delays in
the transfer of property.13 The policy against restraints on alienation
is based upon the belief that "restraints remove property from
commerce, concentrate wealth, prejudice creditors, and discourage
property improvements.""
In most circumstances, covenants that restrain the alienation of
real property are "void" under North Carolina law.165 As the TFC
(suggesting that North Carolina has rejected the Restatement rule regarding the "status
quo" of touch and concern).
157. See MidSouth Golf, L.L.C. v. Fairfield Harbourside Condo. Ass'n, 187 N.C. App.
22, 30, 652 S.E.2d 378, 384 (2007) (refusing to enforce a covenant that did not touch and
concern the land).
158. Transfer Fee Covenants Prohibited Act of 2010, 2010 N.C. Sess. Laws 245
(codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 39A (Supp. 2010)).
159. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 3.2 cmt. b (2000).
160. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES §§ 3.1-3.2.
161. Real Property Marketable Title Act of 1973, ch. 255, 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws 240
(codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47B (2009)).
162. 2010 N.C. Sess. Laws 245. For a discussion of the similarities between the two acts,
see supra Part II.B.
163. SeeN.C. GEN. STAT. § 39A-1 (Supp. 2010); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47B-1 (2010).
164. Crockett v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n of Charlotte, 289 N.C. 620, 627, 224
S.E.2d 580, 585 (1976) (quoting A. JAMES CASNER & W. BARTON LEACH, CASES AND
TEXT ON PROPERTY 1008 (2d ed. 1969)).
165. Id. at 623-24, 224 S.E.2d at 583.
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model has just recently come to North Carolina,'66 it has yet to be
directly challenged in the courts.167 Nevertheless, as suggested above,
if the covenant were to be challenged directly, it is likely that it would
be found invalid because it does not touch and concern the land.'
In North Carolina, it is unlikely that the courts would defer to
the Restatement's new rule over their own traditional conception of
the "touch and concern" requirement.169 Under this inquiry, which
the Restatement itself suggests has been behind many past findings of
invalidity,'70 TFCs would still be unenforceable because they are
against public policy, particularly in North Carolina."' However, if a
court were following the Restatement's emphasis on the public policy
inquiry, there remain several reasons why a TFC could be found to be
against public policy, among them that the instrument restrains the
alienability of real property.
A. Inadequate Disclosure of Transfer Fee Covenants
In the majority of cases, the TFC is located within the dozens, or
more often hundreds, of pages of documents that buyers sign at a
closing.'72 If the TFC is not disclosed to the buyer until closing, it is
unlikely that the buyer would simply be able to walk away from the
transaction upon such disclosure.'7 3 In this situation, the TFC has
taken the buyer by surprise, making it impossible for him to use it to
negotiate a better price, which is suggested as one of the "benefits" of
the TFC model.'74 Even if the TFC is properly disclosed, homebuyers
are so " 'inundated with disclosures when they buy'" that they
" 'usually do not know what documents are important.' """ If the
homebuyer does not understand the effect of the disclosed covenants,
the effect is just the same as if the covenant had been concealed,
166. Snipes, supra note 23, at 6 n.3 (describing the scope of the article as limited to the
three TFCs that are currently filed in North Carolina, indicating that it is a new practice to
the state).
167. As of August 2011, a comprehensive search of the LexisNexis and Westlaw
databases for a case that has directly challenged the TFC model in North Carolina or any
state had returned no results.
168. See supra Part 11I.B.
169. See Randolph, Jr., supra note 156, at 11.
170. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 3.2 cmt. b (2000).
171. For a discussion on the public policy of North Carolina, see supra Part 11.13.
172. See Morrissey, supra note 1.
173. Id.
174. See supra notes 43-49 and accompanying text.
175. Waters, supra note 6 (quoting Rick Akin, real estate attorney).
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which does happen."' In either case, " '[t]he fee will probably be just
a surprise when [the homeowners] decide to sell,'" and the TFC
shows up on their title search."' The de facto surprise fee has many
realtors and title insurance companies worried that homeowners will
find it nearly "impossible . . . to get free and clear title," which
restrains the alienability and transferability of the home."'
B. Inability to "Price" the Effect ofthe Transfer Fee Covenant
Even if the buyer is made aware of the TFC well before closing
and is able to use that knowledge to negotiate a more favorable price,
she may not appreciate exactly how expensive that one percent fee
will someday be-it is a percentage of the total value of the home,
whether the value goes up or down in the future."' The "rational
buyer"' explanation for the TFC model assumes that the covenant
will be discovered and understood by the buyer."' From this
understanding the "rational buyer" will adjust her offer price to
reflect lower perceived value due to the presence of the TFC.'82
However, this assumption presents many problems. First, because the
future TFC payment is based on the future value of the land, the
buyer must be able to calculate current dollar amount of the expected
future value of the land to determine how much to reduce her offer to
account for the presence of the TFC.'m3 Second, for the buyer to
determine the future value of her property, she must know how long
she plans to live on that property."' The amount the purchase price
176. See Snipes, supra note 23, at 3 (explaining the consequences of not disclosing a
TFC or any other covenant for that matter).
177. Waters, supra note 6 (quoting Rick Akin, real estate attorney); see also Morrissey,
supra note 1 (providing an example of a couple who knew nothing about the fee when
they purchased their home).
178. Stephanie Fitch, Proponent of New Real Estate Fee Exempts His Own House,
FORBES.COM (Aug. 24, 2010), http://www.forbes.com/2010/08/24/new-real-estate-fees-
personal-finance-reconveyance-fees.html. It is notable that California, the only state to
have taken legislative action that actually permits the use of TFCs in residential real
estate, requires significant and specific disclosure procedures when TFCs are used. CAL.
CIV. CODE § 1098.5 (West 2011). Even Freehold recognizes the " 'need for adequate
disclosure'" when implementing the TFC instrument. Press Release, Freehold Licensing
Comments on California Assembly Bill 980 (Aug. 26, 2008) (quoting Michael Gagne,
Freehold Licensing Vice President), available athttp://www.thefreelibrary.com
/Freehold+Licensing+Comments+on+California+ Assembly+Bill+980.-aO183854881.
179. Fitch, supra note 178.
180. See supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text.
181. Freyermuth, supra note 5, at 23.
182. Id.
183. R. Wilson Freyermuth, Private Transfer Fee Covenants: Cleaning up the Mess, 45
REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 419, 456-57 (2011).
184. Id. at 457-58.
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should be adjusted will vary greatly for a buyer who plans to resell a
house in two years versus a buyer who plans to live in the house for
forty years.' However, when the initial buyer does resell the
property, she will likely need to do so at a discount in order to
compete with other sellers of unencumbered property, thus losing any
initial savings gained from the discounted purchase price.'"' Finally,
and perhaps most importantly, buyers have little assurance that the
seller has actually reduced the present purchase price to reflect the
presence of the TFC.'"7 If the TFC is presented as a "take it or leave
it" option, the buyer does not have a "meaningful 'covenant or no
covenant' choice."'" This problem is compounded by the lack of
comparable covenant-less properties nearby for the buyer to use as a
"baseline" when evaluating the final price of a home with a TFC.'8s
C. Transfer Fee Covenants Impermissibly Restrain Alienation
A lack of adequate disclosure and the inability of buyers to
accurately price the effect of the TFC will undoubtedly lead to
additional transaction costs, which "impede future land
transactions."'9 0 These costs could be associated with the process of
finding and paying the trustee who holds the transfer fee right or
perhaps tracking down the developer to pay him directly.191 Also, the
seller and buyer will spend time and money negotiating who will pay
the actual transfer fee at the time of the sale.'92 The seller will also
face the ethical, and financial, choice of whether or not to disclose the
presence of the TFC.' 93 These extra costs would tend to limit the
owner's "ability to convey," which is one of the key elements in a
finding that a covenant imposes an "impermissible restraint on
alienation."'94
Nevertheless, not all restraints on alienation are impermissible.
The Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes takes the position
185. Id.
186. Snipes, supra note 23, at 3; see also Harney, supra note 28 (explaining that sellers
may have to sell for less if the home is encumbered by a TFC).
187. Freyermuth, supra note 183, at 458.
188. Freyermuth, supra note 5, at 23.
18 9. Id.
190. Freyermuth, supra note 183, at 461; see also Snipes, supra note 23, at 3 (describing
the practical effects of TFCs that implicitly lead to increased transaction costs).
191. Freyermuth, supra note 5, at 23.
192. Id.; see also Harney, supra note 28 (describing the effects of TFCs on home
owners and buyers alike).
193. Freyermuth, supra note 5, at 23.
194. Bardwell & Durham, supra note 2, at 28.
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that two parties should be allowed the freedom to contract to any
servitude arrangement they desire, so long as it is not
"unconscionable and does not otherwise violate public policy."195 As
stated in one North Carolina Supreme Court decision, such restraint
is permissible " 'if the objectives behind the imposition of the
restraint are sufficiently important to outweigh the social evils which
flow from the enforcement of the restraint or if the interference with
the power of alienation is so insignificant that no appreciable harm
results from the enforcement of the restraint.' "196 Using this
rationale, the "benefit" of the TFC to society-if there is any-is not
greater than the "social evils" of increased transaction costs and
decreased resale values of property.
In sum, it is likely that a court would find a TFC to be against
public policy and therefore an unenforceable covenant.' TFCs are
nonpossessory interests that benefit unrelated private third parties.'9 8
They increase the total cost of owning a home, which in turn limits
the transferability of property.1 99 They further complicate the sale of
residential property and could lead to legal uncertainty.200 They will
likely discourage homeowners from making property improvements
that increase the home's value, as that increase in value will translate
into an increase in the fee paid to the third party beneficiary.2 01 The
homeowners know they would be " 'obliged to share that
appreciation, via the [transfer fee], with people who didn't contribute
at all.' "202 Furthermore, because TFCs reduce the resale price of
affected property,203 the community tax base is lowered, which
reduces the total amount of money available for a city or town to
fund its public programs. 204 Finally, the Federal Housing Finance
Agency has stated in a proposed guidance that the "[e]xpanded use of
private transfer fee covenants poses serious risks to the stability and
195. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 3.5 cmt. a (2000).
196. Crockett v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n of Charlotte, 289 N.C. 620, 628, 224
S.E.2d 580, 586 (1976) (quoting RESTATEMENT OF PROP. § 410 cmt. 2 (1944)).
197. See generally Snipes, supra note 23 (enumerating practical drawbacks of TFCs and
legal issues that arise).
198. Private Transfer Fee Covenants, 75 Fed. Reg. 49,932, 49,933 (Aug. 16, 2010);
Snipes, supra note 23, at 4.
199. 75 Fed. Reg. at 49,933.
200. Id.
201. Snipes, supra note 23, at 4.
202. Fitch, supra note 178 (quoting Kelly Lise Murray, Professor, Vanderbilt School of
Law).
203. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
204. Freyermuth, supra note 5, at 23-24.
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liquidity of the housing finance markets." 205 This agency statement is
in line with the stated public policy of North Carolina that real
property should be "freely alienable and marketable," characterized
as efficient transactions and not delayed by unnecessary investigation
or litigation related to nonpossessory interests that purport to run
with the property for an extended amount of time.206
CONCLUSION
State legislatures across the nation are acting to halt the use of
TFCs. 207 But the North Carolina General Assembly was not simply
swept up in the furor of national legislative activity. Rather, the North
Carolina General Assembly made a conscious decision to strengthen
common law property principles by explicitly prohibiting private
transfer fee covenants. Section 39A of the General Statutes of North
Carolina represents a continuation of the common law property
principles already present in the state. The General Assembly banned
lucrative private TFCs, which benefit only private third parties, while
carving out an exception for owners' associations and environmental
covenants. 208 These two exceptions preserve the traditional uses of
TFCs as funding for homeowners' associations as well as conservation
easements. 20 9 By codifying these principles as a response to the
specific threat posed by the TFC model, the North Carolina General
Assembly strengthened the common law via statute and instructed
North Carolina courts to enforce the public policy of the state by
rejecting pre-existing TFCs.
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